Software-based attacks exploit bugs or vulnerabilities to get unauthorized access or leak confidential information. Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) is a security technique to track spurious information flows and provide strong security guarantees against such attacks. To secure heterogeneous systems, the spurious information flows must be tracked through all their components, including processors, accelerators (i.e., applicationspecific hardware components) and memories. We present PAGU-RUS, a flexible methodology to design a low-overhead shell circuit that adds DIFT support to accelerators. The shell uses a coarsegrain DIFT approach, thus not requiring to make modifications to the accelerator's implementation. We analyze the performance and area overhead of the DIFT shell on FPGAs and we propose a metric, called information leakage, to measure its security guarantees. We perform a design-space exploration to show that we can synthesize accelerators with different characteristics in terms of performance, cost and security guarantees. We also present a case study where we use the DIFT shell to secure an accelerator running on a embedded platform with a DIFT-enhanced RISC-V core.
I. INTRODUCTION
H ETEROGENEOUS systems-on-chip (SoCs) include multiple processor cores and application-specific hardware components, known as hardware accelerators, to reduce power consumption and increase performance [1] - [4] . Several accelerators and accelerator-rich architectures have been developed for different applications, including neural networks [5] , [6] , database processing [7] , [8] , graph processing [9] , [10] , and biomedical applications [11] . There exist two main models of accelerators [12] . Tightly coupled accelerators are embedded within the processor cores as application-specific functional units [13] . They are well-suited for fine-grain computations on small data sets. They require to extend the instruction set architecture of the processor cores to include special instructions and manage their execution. Loosely coupled accelerators, instead, reside outside the processor cores. They typically achieve high speed-ups with coarse-grain computations on big data sets [14] . They are called by software applications through device drivers.
Software-based attacks can exploit security vulnerabilities or bugs in software applications, e.g., buffer overflows and format strings, to obtain unauthorized control of applications, inject
The authors are within the Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, 10027, NY, USA. Emails: piccolboni@cs.columbia.edu, giuseppe@cs.columbia.edu, luca@cs.columbia.edu. This article was presented in the International Conference on Hardware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis (CODES+ISSS) 2018 and appears as part of the ESWEEK-TCAD special issue. Accepted July 2, 2018. DOI: 10.1109/TCAD.2018.2857321 malicious code, etc. [15] . Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT), also known as dynamic taint analysis in the literature, has been proposed as a promising security technique to protect systems against software attacks [16] , [17] . DIFT is based on the observations that (1) it is impossible to prevent the injection of untrustworthy data in software applications (e.g., data coming from software users), and (2) it is very difficult to cover all the possible exploits that use such data. It is better to monitor, i.e., track, the suspicious data flows during the application execution to ensure that they are not exploited and do not cause a security violation. In such a protection scheme, the data flows from the untrustworthy sources are marked as spurious. A security policy imposes what the system is allowed to do with spurious data. For example, a policy can enforce that spurious data values are never used as pointers, thus avoiding buffer-overflow attacks.
Several implementations of DIFT have been proposed in the literature. DIFT has been implemented in hardware [16] , [18] - [20] as well as software [21] , [22] . DIFT has been shown to be effective in protecting systems against several softwarebased attacks, including leakage of information [23] and code injection [24] . DIFT is now implemented on different types of architectures [19] , [25] , including smartphones [23] , [26] . Most of the approaches on hardware-based DIFT focused only on securing processor cores and the associated logic, i.e., tightly coupled accelerators, memories and communication channels. Loosely coupled accelerators, however, have been shown to be vulnerable to attacks [27] , [28] and to date there have been only two works [29] , [30] on DIFT considering such accelerators. We propose PAGURUS as a methodology to extend the support of DIFT to loosely coupled accelerators in heterogeneous SoCs.
Contributions. We make the following contributions:
(1) we present PAGURUS, a flexible methodology to design a low-overhead DIFT shell that secures loosely coupled accelerators; a shell is a hardware circuit whose design is independent from the design of the accelerators, thus simplifying the integration of DIFT in heterogeneous SoCs; we analyze the performance and cost overhead of the shell by synthesizing and running it on FPGAs: the shell has a low impact on execution time and area of the accelerators; (2) we define the metric of information leakage for accelerators to quantitatively measure the security of the DIFT shell: we show that, for any given accelerator, it is possible to find the minimum number of tags (required by DIFT) so that no information leakage is possible; we also show that few tags interleaved in the accelerators data are often sufficient to guarantee the absence of information leakage; arXiv:1912.11153v1 [cs.CR] 18 Dec 2019 (3) we perform a design-space exploration where we consider performance, cost and information leakage as optimization goals for the accelerators design: this study shows how to strengthen the security of hardware-accelerated applications in exchange of lower performance and higher cost; (4) we present a case study where the DIFT shell has been used to protect an accelerator integrated on a embedded SoC [31] we extended with DIFT: this shows why a holistic DIFT approach is necessary for heterogeneous SoCs.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section provides the background. We first describe how DIFT prevents a buffer-overflow attack in practice. Then, we present the architecture of the SoCs and accelerators we target. Finally, we discuss our assumptions and the attack model.
A. Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT)
DIFT is a security technique implemented either in hardware or software to prevent software-based attacks [16] , e.g., buffer overflows. It has been also used, for instance, to avoid leakage of information [23] and secure Web applications [32] . The key idea is to use tags to mark as spurious the data generated by untrustworthy channels, e.g., the input provided by the user to the application. DIFT decouples the concepts of policy (what to do) and mechanism (how to do it). The security policy defines which are the untrustworthy channels and the restrictions to apply on using the data marked as spurious. The mechanism ensures that the untrustworthy data are marked as spurious and the tags are propagated in the rest of the system. The presence of tags is transparent to both software users and programmers.
Example II.1. Consider the stack-based buffer-overflow attack of Fig. 1 . While there are other ways to prevent such attack, e.g., non-executable stack, this simple example illustrates a possible application of DIFT. If the user specifies a number of iterations num higher than 10, then the function pointer func can be overwritten. In this case, another function (foo) can be executed (see the stack reported on the right) instead of the one intended (bar) in a normal execution (stack on the left). The figure reports the commands used to run the program in the two cases. DIFT can prevent this kind of attacks by marking the input of the program (argv) as spurious and by enforcing a policy to avoid using spurious data as pointers. When such violations are detected the processor raises an exception. Several implementations of DIFT have been proposed in the state of the art, as reported in Section IX. Most of these implementations target only processor cores, rather than entire SoCs. Among them, two schemes can be used to manage the tags [29] . With the coupled scheme, the tag is stored physically with its associated data (same address), i.e., the memory word is extended to accommodate the tag. Thus, registers, caches and communication channels are also extended [18] . With the decoupled scheme, instead, the tags are stored separately from the data (different addresses). Typically, the tags are stored in a protected region in memory [19] . In our case, as we move to SoCs, we define a variation of the decoupled scheme where the tags are interleaved with the data. The tags have the same bit width of a memory word. They are inserted by the operating system and the software programmers remain unaware of their presence. With respect to a coupled scheme, an interleaved scheme allows designers to analyze the effect of changing the tag offset, i.e., the number of words between two consecutive tags in memory. This affects the security guarantees as well as the performance and cost of the accelerators (Section V). In addition, this scheme does not require a major modification of the underlying architecture to accommodate the tags. Thus, in this paper, we focus mainly on such interleaved scheme. To show the flexibility of our design methodology, however, we present the case study of an embedded platform that has been extended with DIFT by using a coupled scheme (Section VII).
B. Systems-on-Chip (SoCs) and Accelerators
System-on-Chip Architecture. We target a tile-based architecture [1] as the one shown in Fig. 2 . Each tile implements a processor core (e.g., SPARC V8, RISC-V), a loosely coupled accelerator, or some accessory functionality such as a memory controller. We assume that the processor core supports DIFT as described, for example, in [16] . We aim at extending DIFT to loosely coupled accelerators by leveraging prior works on processor cores. The components in our target SoC communicate by means of a network-on-chip or a bus. The accelerators are managed by the operating system (Linux) trough device drivers.
Accelerator Architecture. This paper focuses on loosely coupled accelerators that have an architecture similar to the one reported in [14] . We designed our accelerators in SystemC, an IEEE-standard object-oriented programming language based on C++ [33] . Fig. 3 shows the architecture, which is common across all the accelerators we have implemented. An accelerator is specified as a SystemC module (i.e., SC_MODULE), and the logic is divided into four components (i.e., SC_CTHREAD). The configuration logic is used to setup the accelerator by means of a set of configuration registers. These registers are memory mapped, and they are managed by the software application through the device driver of the accelerator. They define where the input and the output of the accelerator are in main memory and other parameters that are relevant for the specific accelerator (e.g., the number of pixels of the images for an accelerator that processes images). The load logic reads the input data from main memory by interacting with a DMA controller. The store logic writes the results of the accelerator back in main memory in a similar way. Finally, the compute logic implements the specific computational kernel of the accelerator. The accelerator architecture includes also a private local memory (PLM), or scratchpad, which holds the data during the computation [34] , [35] . PLMs are usually multi-bank memory architectures that provide multiple read and write ports to allow accelerators to perform multiple accesses in parallel (in the same clock cycle). PLMs occupy a large portion of the accelerator logic, and their size is a key parameter for design-space exploration. Typically, loosely coupled accelerators work by dividing the computation into multiple bursts since the workload size is much bigger than the capacity of the PLM [36] . Note that several software applications can offload parts of their computation to the same accelerator at different times. Thus, the PLM is reset at every invocation of the accelerator to guarantee that a process cannot leak data from the PLM previously used by another process.
Accelerator Execution. To offload the computation to an accelerator, its device driver is called. The software application prepares the input data for the accelerator in main memory and uses the Linux system call ioctl() to invoke the device driver. The device driver writes the memory-mapped registers and runs the accelerator. The accelerator raises an interrupt after completing its execution so that the processor can resume the execution of the software application. An example of accelerator execution is shown in Fig. 4 , which also reports the layout in main memory of the accelerator data. The accelerator first loads a subset of the input data by operating with bursts of a fixed length, called burst size. The accelerator loads the data autonomously into its PLM via DMA, without any intervention of the processor core. Each burst is defined by the index in memory from which the data must be read (or must be written to) and the length of the burst in terms of memory words (in Fig. 4 , these values are indicated as pairs above each burst). The burst size is limited by the amount of data that can be stored in the PLM, and it has been shown to be important for design-space exploration [36] . Then, the accelerator computes the results for the given load burst, and it writes them into main memory with a store burst. These three phases can be pipelined by increasing the PLM size. For a given accelerator, it is not necessarily the case that each load burst is followed by one store burst. Some accelerators need multiple load bursts to produce one store burst. For instance, in the case of matrix multiplication, the accelerator needs to load one row from the first input matrix and all the columns from the second input matrix in order to calculate a single row of the output matrix (assuming that the burst size corresponds to the size of a row).
C. Assumptions and Attack Model
We make the following assumptions regarding the hardware architecture, the software environment and the attacker's capabilities 1 . We assume to have a processor extended with DIFT and that the hardware (including the accelerators) is trusted, i.e., no hardware Trojans. We assume that the communication infrastructure that connects the hardware components ( Fig. 2 ) supports the tags. We aim at extending the security guarantees provided by DIFT to accelerators. The architecture may include some common hardware defenses, e.g., non-executable memory. In this paper we address software-based attacks, e.g. bufferoverflow attacks, return-to-libc attacks, etc. We target userspace applications that offload parts of their computation to accelerators. The applications are executed either in the context of the Linux operating system (Section VI) or in bare metal (Section VII). In the first case, we assume that the device drivers run in kernel space, or that they are trusted if they run in user space. We assume that the applications have one or more vulnerabilities, e.g., buffer overflows, format string bugs, etc. The attacker exploits these vulnerabilities through common I/O interfaces, with the goal of affecting the integrity and/or confidentiality of the hardware-accelerated software applications.
III. NEED OF A HOLISTIC DIFT IMPLEMENTATION
Heterogeneous SoCs consist of multiple processor cores and accelerators. To guarantee the security of such systems with DIFT, we need to implement a holistic approach: DIFT must be supported in both processors and accelerators. This ensures that (1) the tags are propagated from the processor cores to the 1 We assume that a hardware implementation of DIFT is available for the processor and the communication infrastructure. A equally valid alternative would be having a hybrid approach where the accelerators are protected in hardware while the software applications are protected by a software-based DIFT approach within the operating system (see Section IX for related work). accelerators and vice versa, and (2) the policies are enforced (i.e., the tags are checked) in both processors and accelerators.
Example III.1. Consider the code reported in Fig. 5 that can be used, for example, in a video-surveillance system. Suppose that ref contains a face image that is compared with the image passed through argv. We want to enforce a DIFT policy that ensures that ref cannot be leaked for any reason. Before the comparison, ref is converted to the same format of the input image, e.g., from RGB to grayscale. The function for the conversion is initially implemented in software (gray_software). The processor, which supports DIFT, guarantees that when this image is manipulated it is properly tagged. In other words, the tags are propagated and no leaks are possible. Suppose that the conversion is now implemented with an equivalent accelerator to improve performance (gray_hardware). If the accelerator is not extended with DIFT, ref is vulnerable to leaks.
IV. DIFT SHELL FOR ACCELERATORS
We designed the DIFT shell to be double decoupled with respect to the accelerator, and to be flexible. In this section, we first discuss the shell architecture and how it encapsulates the accelerator. Then, we discuss such design choices.
A. Implementation of the DIFT Shell
Shell Architecture. We designed the DIFT shell in SystemC with an architecture similar to the accelerators. Fig. 6 shows how the shell encapsulates the accelerator and distinguishes the data flows (black solid arrows) from the tag flows (red dashed arrows). The logic is divided into three main components. The configuration logic (configuration shell in Fig. 6 to distinguish it from the configuration logic of the accelerator of Fig. 3 ) sets up the shell through a set of configuration registers. The shell has 2×N +2 memory-mapped registers, where N is the number of registers of the accelerator. Each register of the accelerator is tagged to ensure that it cannot be easily compromised by an attacker since it can contain sensitive information such as the addresses in main memory where the inputs and outputs of the accelerator reside. Note that the registers containing the tags are not visible to the software applications and they are managed by the device driver. We have also two additional configuration registers. The register src_tag is used to specify the value of the tags interleaved in the input of the accelerator and in the configuration registers. The register dst_tag has the value of the tags to be interleaved in the output of the accelerator. The values of these two registers are not visible to the software applications. They are managed by the device driver of the accelerator. In particular, these values are passed from the processor when the device driver is called. In this way the tags can be propagated similarly to the case in which the accelerator functionality is executed in software. This is a form of coarse-grain DIFT, where the output tags of the accelerators are determined solely on the basis of the input tags 2 . There are other two components in the shell of Fig. 6 . The load logic (load shell) receives the read requests of the accelerator and it modifies them to consider the tags, i.e., the shell modifies the base address in memory and the length of the requests to include the tags if necessary. Then, it passes the values to the accelerator while checking that the tag values interleaved with input data in main memory match the value specified in src_tag. In case of mismatch, it immediately stops the execution of the accelerator. The store logic (store shell) intercepts the write requests of the accelerator in a similar way and writes the results of the accelerator by interleaving the tags with the value in dst_tag.
Tag Interleaving. We use an interleaved scheme to handle the tags (Section II-A): the tags are interleaved in memory with a fixed tag offset. However, interleaving the tags uniformly in memory by starting always from the same location is not secure. An attacker could infer the locations of the tags, for instance by executing the accelerator repeatedly. The attacker could then replace the input of the accelerator with malicious data by skipping the tag locations. Therefore, in our implementation of the DIFT shell, we keep a fixed distance (in words) between two consecutive tags in memory, but we randomize the location of the first tag interleaved in the input data at every execution of the accelerator to make it not predictable. The DIFT shell needs to know the offset of the first tag embedded in the input in order to check the tags and pass only the data values to the accelerator. To do that, we add another configuration register to the shell of Fig. 6 . The location of the first tag is generated with a pseudo-random number generator. We chose to use a single tag value for the input (src_tag) and a single tag value for the output (dst_tag) of the accelerator. However, (1) the pattern with which the tags are interleaved in the input and output of the accelerator and (2) the number of different values for the tags can be customized to offer stronger security guarantees without requiring any modification to the accelerator implementation. Alternatively, it is possible to use data-dependent tags instead of a randomized approach, i.e., the values of src_tag and dst_tag can be calculated by applying a crypto hash function to the inputs and outputs of a specific accelerator execution.
Shell Execution. Fig. 7 shows an example of execution of the DIFT shell encapsulating an accelerator. We consider the case where the tag offset is equal to one, i.e., the size of the input and output of the accelerator is doubled to add to each value a tag in the next memory location. This corresponds to the case where we have the maximum number of tags in memory. The load requests of the accelerator consist of two memory words. The shell modifies such requests by doubling the amount of data to include the tags. While doing so, the shell verifies that the tags from the main memory contain the value specified in src_tag. Similarly, the store requests from the accelerator (two memory words) are modified to interleave the tags with the value in dst_tag, thus marking the outputs.
B. Adaptability of the DIFT Shell
Double Decoupling. Inspired by the principles of latencyinsensitive design [37] , we designed the DIFT shell to be double decoupled from the accelerator implementation, i.e., the design of the accelerator is independent from the design of the shell, and the design of the shell is independent from the design of the accelerator. Besides the I/O interface, the shell needs to know only the number of configuration registers of the accelerator, which is usually decided at design time. This allows designers to rapidly integrate DIFT in their accelerators. Designers can also easily extend third-party intellectual property (IP) cores with DIFT in their SoCs, simplifying the implementation of a holistic DIFT approach. For example, the generation of the shell and the connection with the accelerator, in our implementation, is done automatically. This design choice makes the design of the shell be independent from the accelerators design as well, which guarantees the reusability of the shell. Note that the tags are not propagated into the logic of the accelerators, which remain completely unaware of the tags. This guarantees a minimal area overhead, but it could limit the set of policies a designer may want to support, as discussed in Section VIII.
Flexibility. The DIFT shell is flexible because the interface to communicate with the network-on-chip or bus (Section II-B) is decoupled from the internal logic. In addition, the shell and the accelerator expose the same interface, allowing designers to easily replace an accelerator with its encapsulated version. Note also that the shell can be easily customized to the needs of the specific accelerator, for example to (1) improve performance or (2) strengthen security. In Section IV-A we presented an implementation of the shell that uses an interleaved scheme for the tags. The shell can be adapted to work with different schemes as well. We show an example of this customization in Section VII.
V. A SECURITY METRIC FOR ACCELERATORS
In this section we define a security metric for accelerators to quantitatively evaluate the security guarantees provided by the DIFT shell. This metric is a valuable parameter for a multiobjective design-space exploration of accelerators, where not only performance and cost but also security is a critical aspect.
A. Information Leakage: Metric Definition
Definition V.1. The information leakage is the amount of data that can be produced as output by an accelerator before its shell realizes that the input has been corrupted by an attacker.
Example V.1. To calculate the information leakage for a given accelerator execution, we consider the worst-case scenario: the first tag is inserted in the farthest location in main memory, according to the value of the tag offset, from the beginning of the input data of the accelerator. In other words, the tag is at the memory location with address base_addr + tag_offset, where base_addr is the first address in main memory where the input of the accelerator is stored. This scenario is depicted in Fig. 8 (a) . An attacker could try to corrupt the input data of the accelerator in memory. However, in doing so, the attacker would inadvertently overwrite the first tag as well ( Fig. 8 (b) ). In fact, the attacker cannot easily determine the exact distance between two consecutive tags in memory and the initial offset of the tags, thanks to the randomized approach we adopted for the DIFT shell (Section IV). Thus, the information leakage is the percentage of output values (produced by the accelerator before the shell realizes that it has been compromised) with respect to the total amount of values the accelerator would generate if it was not compromised. This corresponds to the amount of output produced by the accelerator before the shell stops its execution ( Fig. 8 (c) ). The shell realizes that it has been compromised when it reads the first tag, which has been overwritten by the attacker 3 . This calculation represents an upper bound to the information leakage. Note that the same reasoning can be applied when the attacker tries to corrupt the input of the accelerator not by starting from base_addr.
The generic security concept of "information leakage" has been adapted to our context with Definition V.1. Note that this definition applies to the decoupled scheme that we discussed in Section II-A, where the tags are interleaved in memory with the data. This definition does not apply to the coupled scheme since each data is stored with its tag. For such a scheme we can adopt the concept of security proportionality [29] . Next, we describe how information leakage is influenced by different factors. 
B. Information Leakage: Metric Analysis
We perform a quantitative information-flow analysis [38] to measure the information leakage caused by the accelerators when protected with the DIFT shell. In our analysis, we found that information leakage depends on the following factors.
(1) Tag Density. The more tags we interleave in the input data of the accelerator, the higher is the likelihood that the shell hits a tag that has been corrupted before producing an output.
The information leakage is expected to decrease as the tag density increases. The tag density is thus a key parameter for a multi-objective design-space exploration that considers cost, performance, and security of accelerators. In fact, by increasing the number of tags in memory we guarantee potentially a lower information leakage because it is more likely that the attacker replaces a tag (as shown in Fig. 8 ). This, however, negatively affects the performance (more input/output to process) and cost (overhead for the tags in memory) of executing the accelerator.
(2) Algorithm. The algorithm implemented by the accelerator defines the amount of inputs needed to calculate an output. This affects the memory access pattern, and thus the security.
Example V.2. Consider two algorithms: (1) image conversion from RGB to grayscale values, and (2) matrix multiplication. For (1) to calculate one grayscale value we need only the RGB value in the corresponding position in the input image. For (2), instead, we need to load a row and a column of the input matrices to calculate a single value of the output matrix.
The information leakage is expected to be higher for those accelerators that require fewer input values to calculate the corresponding output value. In fact, accelerators usually work in bursts. If an accelerator needs fewer input to calculate an output, a lower number of load bursts is required to produce a corresponding store burst. Thus, it is more likely that the accelerator produces outputs before the shell finds an invalid tag.
(3) Implementation. The specific way in which the accelerator implements the algorithm can affect the information leakage.
Example V.3. Consider an accelerator performing the conversion from RGB to grayscale. If it operates in bursts of 16 pixels, each load burst of 16 pixels produces a store burst of 16 pixels (for an efficient use of the PLM). Similarly, if the accelerator uses bursts of 1024 pixels, each load of 1024 pixels produces a store burst of 1024 pixels. Assume there is one tag every 1024 pixels in the input image in main memory: in the first case, the accelerator leaks data before encountering a tag that has been compromised (in the worst-case scenario), while, in the second case, the accelerator does not cause leakage.
The information leakage is expected to decrease as the burst size increases. In fact, the larger are the bursts, the higher is the probability of finding a tag. The burst size affects performance and cost as well. Larger bursts require larger PLMs for storing data during the computation (higher cost), but they improve the efficiency of data transfers because few large bursts via DMA are generally much more efficient than many small bursts [36] . (4) Workload Size. The workload size determines the total amount of data the accelerator needs to process. This affects the memory access pattern, and thus the information leakage.
If the accelerator works on relatively small inputs, the input set can be entirely stored in the PLM. The accelerator does not need to work in bursts and it cannot cause information leakage (if there is at least one tag in the input). If the accelerator works on relatively large inputs (the common case for loosely coupled accelerators), then it is necessary to work in bursts, and the leakage is affected by the burst size as described in Example V.3.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section presents the results. We first describe the setup for the experiments (Section VI-A). Then, we discuss the results of three design-space explorations that show how the information leakage (VI-B), the space overhead (VI-C), and the performance and cost of accelerators (VI-D) vary depending on the accelerator, the tag density, the burst size and the workload size.
A. Experimental Setup
We designed three accelerators (Section II-B): GRAY, MEAN, and MULTS. GRAY converts a RGB image into a grayscale image. MEAN calculates the arithmetic mean over the columns of a two-dimensional matrix. MULTS performs the multiplication of a two-dimensional matrix by its transpose. All the inputs and outputs of the accelerators are 64-bit fixed points, except for the GRAY input values that are three 16-bit integer values (RGB). We chose to implement and analyze these accelerators since they exhibit different input/output behaviors. In particular, GRAY needs a single load burst to produce a store burst since it operates in streaming. In contrast, MEAN and MULTS require multiple load bursts. MULTS differ from MEAN because it needs to access the same data multiple times (at maximum two rows, or a portion of two rows depending on the burst size, can be stored in the PLMs), and it needs the entire input to produce few output values. We designed the accelerators in SystemC. We performed high-level synthesis with Cadence Stratus HLS 17.20 Fig. 9 . Measurements of information leakage for the three accelerators and workloads reported in Table I . The legend indicates the values of the tag offset. and logic synthesis with Xilinx Vivado 2017.4. We targeted a Virtex-7 XC7V2000T FPGA. We adopted the same systemlevel design flow for synthesizing the DIFT shell.
B. Quantitative Security Analysis
We performed a design-space exploration of the three accelerators by considering three metrics: information leakage, burst size and tag density. For each accelerator we considered three workloads, whose characteristics are reported in Table I . Note that the size of the workloads determines the number of bursts of the specific accelerator. For example, in the case of MEAN with burst size of 2 7 bytes, 1024 bursts are necessary to load the input matrix for the workload "small" (size: 2 17 bytes). The results are reported in Fig. 9 . Each graph reports the results for a specific accelerator and workload. The xaxis of each graph reports the burst size in bytes (log scale). The y-axis reports the percentage of information leakage. The colors/shapes indicate the distance between two consecutive tags in memory, i.e., the tag offset (the larger is the tag offset, the lower is the tag density). We calculated the information leakage as described in Example V.1 (the worst-case scenario). For this, we did not randomize the location of the first tag in memory to determine an upper bound of the information leakage. For each accelerator and workload we can identify the maximum value of tag offset that guarantees 0% of information leakage. This corresponds to the case where we interleave at least one tag in the sequence of load bursts that are necessary to calculate a single store burst. Note that the tag offset for all the accelerators is relatively high compared to what we would expect for software applications, due to the fact that the accelerators work in bursts. From these experiments we can also determine the minimum value of tag offset that produces 100% of information leakage. This corresponds to the case where there are no tags in the input of the accelerator. Between the maximum and the minimum values of the tag offset, the information leakage depends on the burst size. The larger is the burst size, the lower is the information leakage because it is more likely to find a tag in main memory. The information leakage gradually decreases by increasing the burst size until it reaches 0%, where the total size of the load bursts necessary to produce a store burst has become large enough to hit a tag in the input. By looking at the behaviors of the different accelerators we notice that: for MEAN, the information leakage quickly decreases since it is a reduction operation; for GRAY, we have more information leakage because for one store burst we need only a single load burst; MULTS exhibits the lowest leakage because the algorithm needs to access most of the input matrix to produce the first store burst. In fact, to produce the first row of the output matrix, MULTS needs to read all the rows of the input matrix, i.e., the entire input. Therefore, it can leak only few output values before realizing that a tag has been overwritten.
Remarks. This experiment shows that, for any given accel- erator with a certain burst size, it is possible to determine the tag offset that guarantees a target information leakage. This can be determined automatically and permits to choose the tag offset for the DIFT shell depending on the characteristics of the specific accelerator and the workload it needs to execute.
C. Space Overhead Analysis
We performed a design-space exploration of the accelerators and workloads of Table I by considering three metrics: information leakage, space overhead and tag density. We measured the space overhead in terms of number of tags added to the input and output of the accelerators in main memory. The results are reported in Fig. 10 . Each graph reports the results for a specific accelerator and workload. The x-axis reports the number of tags added to the input and output of the accelerator (log scale), the y-axis reports the percentage of information leakage, and the colors/shapes indicate the tag offset. Since the information leakage depends on the burst size ( Fig. 9 ), we reported the information leakage for the smallest and the largest bursts considered in Fig. 9 , i.e., 2 6 and 2 13 bytes respectively. Protecting MULTS requires the lowest space overhead since the accelerator accesses quickly the entire input and few tags embedded in the input are sufficient to reduce significantly the information leakage. MEAN exhibits similar space overheads because it is a reduction operation. However, MEAN presents much higher information leakage due to its access pattern. GRAY is more difficult to protect compared to the other accelerators because it needs a single load burst for each store burst. Thus, a higher number of tags must be embedded in the input of the accelerator to reduce the information leakage. Another aspect to note is that for GRAY and MULTS there is no much difference of information leakage for the smallest and the largest bursts, while for MEAN the burst size highly affects the information leakage.
Remarks. This experiment shows that few tags embedded in the input and output of the accelerators are often sufficient to reduce significantly the information leakage of accelerators.
D. Performance and Cost Analysis
Performance. In order to analyze performance and cost we completed a third design-space exploration by considering three metrics: execution time, burst size and tag density. For each accelerator we used the workloads in Table I . The results are reported in Fig. 11 . Each graph reports the results for a specific accelerator and workload. The x-axis of each graph reports the burst size in bytes (log scale), the y-axis reports the execution time normalized to the slowest implementation, and the color/shape indicates the tag offset. The execution time reported in these experiments corresponds to the time required by the accelerator to process the given workload in hardware. To measure the execution time for each combination of accelerator, burst size and tag offset, we leveraged the Embedded Scalable Platforms (ESP) methodology [1] , [39] to design an SoC that includes a processor core (LEON3), a memory controller, and the specific accelerator. We ran these experiments on the FPGA by booting Linux on the processor core. The accelerators are called through their corresponding device drivers. We considered three values (1, 64, 4096) as tag offset and compared the execution time with respect to the case in which the accelerators do not use the DIFT shell. The graphs in Fig. 11 show that the overhead in execution time increases as the tag offset decreases. In fact, having more tags augments the time required by the accelerator to read the input data from main memory and store back the results. The overhead of DIFT is relatively small for all the different workload sizes, and we expect that with larger tag offsets it would be even smaller. For workload sizes much smaller than the ones reported in Table I , we expect that the overhead of DIFT would be higher since the execution times of the accelerator would be shorter and using tags would have a more significant impact on such executions. Note that, however, loosely coupled accelerators typically work on relatively large data sets, as the ones used in our experiments, for which DIFT has a low overhead. Note that in some graphs, the accelerators with DIFT seem to be faster than the baseline. However, this effect is caused by the noise of the operating system running system processes concurrently to the accelerators. Finally, note that by increasing the burst size, the accelerators become faster since it is more efficient performing few large bursts rather than many small bursts [36] .
Cost. The DIFT shell is independent from the accelerators design and has a fixed area. For the Xilinx XC7V2000T FPGA, the shell requires only ∼1600 LUTs and ∼1400 flops/latches.
Remarks. This experiment shows that the area overhead of DIFT is negligible, while the overhead in execution time is affected by the tag density and the workload size. The tag density is thus an optimization parameter for the accelerators design: designers can strengthen or weaken the security of accelerators in exchange of lower or higher performance, respectively.
VII. PULPINO CASE STUDY
To show the flexibility of PAGURUS, we extended an opensource embedded SoC called PULPino [31] to support DIFT. We extended the RI5CY processor core in PULPino to support tagging [20] , and we integrated one of our accelerators. We implemented a buffer-overflow attack and show why a holistic DIFT approach is needed to prevent software-based attacks. While more convoluted and critical attacks can be implemented, the software-based attack discussed here is representative of the vulnerabilities that can be exploited in heterogeneous SoCs.
A. Extending PULPino with DIFT
We extended RI5CY, which is an in-order single-issue core with 4 pipeline stages. We modified each stage to propagate and check the tags. We extended the registers of RI5CY as Fig. 12 . Buffer-overflow attack on the PULPino SoC [31] . In scenario (1), mean is executed in software. In scenario (2) and (3), mean is executed in hardware without the DIFT shell (2) and with the DIFT shell (3).
well. We added new assembly instructions for initializing the tags stored in the register file and in the data memory. In this case study, we used a coupled scheme to manage the tags. We extended the PULPino platform buses to accommodate tag transfers in parallel with the regular data transfers. We used four bits as width of the tag to support the byte addressing mode of RISC-V and to distinguish only the spurious data from the non-spurious data at the byte level. We also integrated the MEAN accelerator by adapting its interface to the AXI4 interface of PULPino. We designed two versions of this platform. In the first, we did not encapsulate the MEAN accelerator with the DIFT shell. In the second we added the DIFT shell. We synthesized the platforms by targeting a Xilinx XC7Z020 FPGA.
B. Attacking PULPino with DIFT
We implemented a buffer-overflow attack on the PULPino platform extended with DIFT. The code is reported in Fig. 12 . A buffer-overflow attack occurs in the function load_input. Similarly to the attack of Fig. 1 , the attacker overwrites the input (ld_data) with the base address of the function foo. Note that, differently from the attack of Fig. 1 , this attack cannot be prevented with non-executable stack because the data structures reside in global memory. Other attacks, such as heap overflow, can be implemented in a similar way. The attacker calls the function mean by specifying that the size of the input is 5 × 5. The accelerator produces the output (st_data), but it also overwrites the function pointer func since the output buffer can store only 4 values and not 5 (this causes a second buffer overflow). The function mean can be implemented in hardware or software. In both cases, we want to enforce a policy that specifies that spurious values can never be used as pointers. We tested the following scenarios by running the code in bare metal:
(1) mean is performed in software: the buffer-overflow attack is capable of overwriting the function pointer func (see the data in main memory reported on the left); however, since the data coming from argv are spurious their use as a pointer is not permitted. Thus, an exception is raised; (2) mean is performed in hardware with the accelerator MEAN not protected with the DIFT shell: in this case the tags are not propagated from the input to the output of the accelerator (see the data in main memory reported on the right) and the attack is not prevented (func is not tagged); (3) mean is performed in hardware with the accelerator MEAN protected by the DIFT shell: in this case the attack is prevented as in the first case (memory reported on the left) thanks to the tag propagation performed by the shell.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS
This section discusses the benefits and limits of PAGURUS.
A. Coarse-grain Versus Fine-grain DIFT
We designed the DIFT shell to extend the support of DIFT to accelerators. The design of the accelerator is independent from the design of the shell, and the design of the shell remains independent from the design of the accelerator. Essentially, in our approach, the accelerator is a black box and the tags are not propagated inside the accelerator. The shell is responsible of the tagging. It communicates with the processor core, which decides the output tags given the input tags (at the acceleratorlevel granularity). This implementation can be called coarsegrain DIFT, by using the same terminology currently used for processor cores (the tags are computed at the instruction-level granularity) [16] . The alternative is fine-grain DIFT, where the internal logic of the accelerator (or the processor) is augmented to support tagging at the gate-level granularity, e.g., [30] , [40] .
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, fine-grain DIFT allows a significant reduction of the false positives because it is not necessary to take conservative choices to implement policies [30] . On the other hand, extending the logic has a significant impact on both area and power. This is especially true for accelerators, where up to 90% of the area is occupied by the PLM [35] , which needs to be extended to support tagging. As a result, up to 31% of additional logic for accelerators can be necessary [30] . Coarse-grain DIFT causes more false positives. We showed, however, that the overhead in area is negligible and no modifications are required to the accelerators, i.e., our approach can also be used for third-party IPs.
B. Tightly Coupled Accelerators
In this paper we focused on loosely coupled accelerators. Tightly coupled accelerators are required to support DIFT as well to secure heterogeneous SoCs and avoid attacks similar to the one we implemented on PULPino (Section VII). Similarly to the case of loosely coupled accelerators, two alternative implementations are possible. With coarse-grain DIFT, the tightly coupled accelerators are black boxes and the tags are computed at the instruction-level granularity. With fine-grain DIFT, instead, the internal logic of the accelerators is extended [30] . We argue that these alternatives have the same advantages and disadvantages discussed for loosely coupled accelerators.
IX. RELATED WORK
DIFT, also called dynamic taint analysis, is a security technique to prevent several software-based attacks [16] , [21] , [41] , [42] . Several variations of DIFT have been proposed. Most of these approaches focus on supporting DIFT on processor cores. For example, there are approaches that extend the processor cores and propagate the tags through the entire architecture by extending caches, memories, and communication channels [18] , [20] , [25] , [41] . They differ on the target architecture, on how they manage the tags (coupled or decoupled scheme) and on the bit widths of the tags [29] . Other approaches adopt a coprocessor to decouple the verification and the propagation of the tags from the main processor core [19] , [43] , [44] . Some approaches are optimized for specific types of architectures, e.g., speculative processors [45] , SMT processors [46] , and smarthphones [23] , [26] . There exist also software-only implementations of DIFT [21] , [22] , [41] , [47] , whose overhead is usually high [17] . Finally, there are approaches that explore the implementation of DIFT for tag propagation at different design abstraction levels [24] , [40] to minimize the number of false positives. All these approaches are complementary to PAGURUS. In fact, PAGURUS can be used to easily extend the support for DIFT, implemented on processors, to accelerators.
Most of the approaches on hardware-based DIFT focus on supporting DIFT on processor cores rather than entire SoCs. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two works in the literature in the direction of a holistic DIFT implementation. WHISK [29] targets SoCs with loosely coupled accelerators. WHISK implements fine-grain DIFT on accelerators, differently from PAGURUS that realizes a coarse-grain DIFT approach. PAGURUS interleaves the tags with the data, while in WHISK the tags are stored in a different region of memory. Finally, while we define the concept of information leakage which is an accelerator-dependent metric, in WHISK the authors used the concept of security proportionality, which is the amount of tags supplied as input to the accelerator. Another work related to accelerators is TaintHLS [30] , which is a methodology to automatically add support for fine-grain DIFT on accelerators developed with high-level synthesis. TaintHLS cannot be used to secure hard IP cores as well as soft IP cores designed at RTL without licensable high-level descriptions. Also, by using a finegrain approach, TaintHLS can incur in significant area overhead (up to 31%) because the accelerators logic must be extended.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We presented PAGURUS, a flexible methodology to design a circuit shell that extends DIFT to loosely coupled accelerators. The design of the DIFT shell is independent from the design of the accelerators and vice versa. This allows designers to quickly support DIFT on their accelerators in heterogeneous SoCs. We studied the effect of the shell on the cost and performance of the accelerators by running experiments on a FPGA. We showed that the cost of the shell is negligible compared to the cost of the accelerators. The performance overhead depends on the tag density, which is a parameter that can be tuned by designers to strengthen or weaken the security guarantees of the particular accelerator. To quantitatively measure such security guarantees, we defined a metric, called information leakage. We performed a multi-objective design-space exploration and showed that we can synthesize implementations of accelerators encapsulated with the DIFT shell that present different trade-offs in terms of performance, cost and information leakage. We also showed that, for any given accelerator, it is possible to determine the minimum amount of tagging for DIFT that guarantees absence of information leakage. Finally, we presented a case study where we extended PULPino to support DIFT and we showed the effectiveness of the DIFT shell in preventing a bufferoverflow attack that exploits a loosely coupled accelerator.
